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ABSTRACT 
Zesely Bryan Haislip III - In The Midst of Europe: The United States and European Security 
Cooperation  
(Under the Direction of Holger Moroff) 
 
 Given recent focus on a supposed U.S. policy shift to the Pacific region, this research 
looks to Europe and the security cooperation organizations to understand if this new focus has 
come due to increased distance between the United States and European countries. The analysis 
intends to show that there is still a strong connection between the two sides of the Atlantic, and 
that the United States has many avenues through which to stay in touch with decisions made in 
European security organizations. Important background on the institutional development of the 
two case organizations creates a foundation to understand the analysis and conclusions. Through 
analysis of NATO and CSDP, it is clear that the United States has a strong ability to influence 
the civilian and military operations carried out by the European Union’s supposedly independent 
defense institution.  
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I. Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, regional security cooperation has been in a state of change 
and evolution. Because the period from the 1945 to 1989 held such tension, security 
organizations were commonplace and the need for them was obvious. However, with the fall of 
the United Soviet Socialist Republic, a common defense organization focused around 
counterbalancing the Soviet threat was left with a mission that lacked direction. This lack of a 
singular opponent was widely hypothesized to lead to the decline of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), simply because it would become a defense institution without a common 
enemy. For an organization that had been so integral in the international arena since the end of 
World War II this seemed and odd turn of events yet it was the logical conclusion many drew 
from the institutional structure and the stated goals of NATO throughout the Cold War. In 
addition, the new, security-focused, branch of the European Union was still trying to find a 
footing in Europe and the world. The fledgling European Union institution was given little 
chance to succeed due to poor experiences in past attempts at political or defense iterations. The 
doubt in regards to this institution also grew from the years of focus on economic issues and a 
seeming avoidance of a more high-level issue like security. This had been separated and seen as 
the territory in which NATO would act. However, the experience of both of these actors has 
outstripped the expectations of scholars and policymakers alike. NATO has adapted its mission 
and structure in order to reassert its necessity in the post-Cold War world; and the Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been learning and evolving as it time goes on and has 
finally begun to operate missions and do work in areas it cares about. The Balkan conflicts in the 
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mid-1990s gave the organizations a new purpose – to clean up in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
This meant crisis management, conflict prevention, and other valuable peace processes that 
required redesigning and developing new goals and tactics. 
This research will look into these two actors and use them as case studies to examine the 
potential impact of the United States in major European security organizations. The historical 
and theoretical backgrounds will set the stage and help to show why the analysis made by this 
paper is currently needed. Using appropriate international relations theory in coordination with 
relevant integration theory will allow the analysis to address issues in both the structure and 
actions of these two organizations. The analysis will focus on the decision-making structures and 
military/police actions of each institution as examples of how the United States can or does have 
an impact on these actors. By addressing these two facets of the institutions, the analysis will 
look at a more complete picture than if it was to focus strictly on the military capabilities of 
either. The main analysis will be followed by a section on the implications of the research and 
the ways in which such possibility for influence is important for those in both theoretical and 
practical fields. Through the investigation of potential implications, the analysis intends to show 
that NATO and the European Union are open to US influence, even if they are not directly under 
such an influence.  
Overall, this research will show that, given the current state of affairs in the international 
arena, the United States has the ability to make a strong and measurable impact on the ways in 
which regional security issues are handled. Whether it chooses to act on the ability it has is well 
beyond the scope of this analysis, but the implications of such influence will be discussed 
following the analysis. By doing this, the analysis hopes to show that the security of Europe and 
the European Union are still inexorably tied to the United States; and despite the relatively 
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popular idea of the shift to a more Asia-centric model in U.S. grand strategy there is still a great 
importance placed on the transatlantic link. 
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II. Literature/Background 
 The substantive literature for this research revolving around NATO and the European 
Union falls into three main categorical groups. The first of these looks at the institutional 
evolution that has brought them into their current iterations, by doing this the literature creates a 
strong background for the categories that follow. Both underwent a substantive phase of change 
in the early 1990s, and it is from these challenges that the present structures developed. The 
second grouping is literature used in the analysis to cover the decision-making structures of the 
two institutions and to help illustrate similarities and differences in the way they reach agreement 
on an issue or begin deployment of forces. The last set of sources relating to NATO and the EU 
specifically addresses the concrete actions taken by NATO and the Common Security and 
Defense Policy branch of the EU. In using these sources, the analysis combines the history of the 
organizations and the decision-making processes to understand how and why they do what they 
do. Within each of these sections, research includes specific examples relating to the connection 
between the two groups and their members. 
 
 Much literature has been produced on the state of NATO since the end of Cold War, and 
the whole range of predictions were made. Some scholars such as Gärtner (1998, 10) predicted 
the evolution of the security arena in a way that specialized NATO to maintain its collective 
defense while a new institution was created to deal with the new need for crisis management. 
Others took a more drastic approach, deeming the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold 
War as the “end of history” as had been known and the arrival of a more homogeneous and 
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universal system (Fukuyama 1989, 1). In either case, such predictions apparently underestimated 
the institutional inertia of NATO; meanwhile almost no one expected the introduction of a 
European Union security entity to take over relevant responsibility from the Western European 
Union. Conflict still exists and while those predicting a rise in the need for crisis management 
were correct, how it would be handled was hard to determine.  
For the EU, life until the end of the Cold War was about evolution and growth, but with a 
focus on economic integration and the strength of a market. While this has continued with the 
expansion of the common market and the introduction of a common currency, the most 
surprising thing to emerge in the post-Cold War era has been a renewed focus on the political 
and security aspects of integration. After failed attempts at political union during its early stages, 
the EU mostly abandoned such aspirations with the goal of functionally integrating in the way 
that best improved the European situation after World War II. However, the relatively new 
European common security project is seen by those within the Union as a logical step given the 
evolution of the EU and its increasing role in international interactions. If they are to be more 
involved than ever, they should have a role that is complete and multifaceted (Anderson 2006, 
25). Their initial push to be taken seriously in military terms was overzealous, though not 
without good intention. However, the 60,000-troop goal was unlikely to succeed from the start, 
and instead a more cooperative notion came into being.  
 
 Due to the historical context of these institutions, both NATO and the EU have made 
drastic changes in their mission and structure in order to adapt to the new international 
environment. However, it is the decision-making processes – and the actions that result from 
such decisions – that are of more interest in this context. One key part of the change is the Berlin 
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Plus agreement, a series of negotiated guidelines that expand the interconnectivity of the two 
organizations and allow the European Union to make use of “NATO assets and capabilities” 
(eeas.europa.eu). Finalized in 2003 three after many years of summits and negotiations, Berlin 
Plus creates a common ground on intelligence sharing, planning infrastructure, and in-field 
command capabilities. By doing this, the two groups illustrate the changing climate and fully set 
the stage for a larger connection in the future. It was in fact, a key element in giving CSDP the 
technical ability to undertake military missions as opposed to monitoring or police missions 
(eeas.europa.eu).  
 For NATO decisions are made at multiple levels within the institution, with the 
importance and thematic context of the issue playing a large role in how the decision process is 
undertaken. The North Atlantic Council is the main decision-making institution and it uses a 
consensus building process in order to pass decisions. They have deliberately separated their idea 
of consensus from that of unanimity because there are no formal votes to determine a decision. 
Instead, they rely on a process through which uncertainty – spoken and unspoken – is taken into 
account and addressed. If consensus cannot be reached initially, the options will be amended in 
such a way as to best fit the needs and ideals of the members. This body consists of one 
representative from each member country; and it is chaired by an impartial Secretary General. 
These representatives work on important (but usually non-military) issues like the overarching 
Strategic Concept for the organization, the institutional budget, and the working of the 
Partnership for Peace (Gallis 2003, 2). However, another body deals with the other issues not 
addressed by the NAC. This institution is known as the Military Committee and, similar to the 
NAC, is made up of representatives from each member country. The only exception to this is 
France, as they removed themselves from the Military Committee in 1966 while under the 
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presidency of Charles de Gaulle (Gallis 2003, 2). Decisions started in this branch of NATO are 
often made and then passed to the NAC for approval although this is not a necessary step. Issues 
that will be problematic for French national interest are sometimes passed directly from the 
Military Committee as a means to circumvent a potential consensus stalemate.  
 The European Union is a relatively more complex organization to understand, however it 
contains some basic features of the decision-making process that can allow analysis of CSDP to 
be more comprehensible. Three main groups that have a strong impact on the CSDP actions, and 
others have influence depending on the saliency of the military issue being addressed. These are 
the Council Working Groups (CWGs), Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), 
and the Political and Security Committee (PSC). These groups may work in concert or 
individually, but they tend to have similar processes for reaching a decision. The theory behind 
the way that the European Union has integrated and formed these groups will be discussed in the 
next section, but what is most important for understanding the decision-making process is the 
combination of rational bargaining and unanimity based consensus building. While these things 
are often put in contrast to each other, scholarly work shows that within the European Union this 
sort of blurring of lines is common (Howorth 2012, 439). The CWGs are consensus-building 
groups that are often seen as places for a stronger influence of member states but in fact, they 
tend to be a place for the socialization of national representatives. Similarly, Howorth (2012, 
442) describes the atmosphere of COREPER as “cognitive blurring of the sharp definitional 
boundaries between the national and the European”. Through this, the author intends to show 
that these groups work hard within their mandate to do the best job possible for the benefit of the 
decision, not necessarily in regards to the red lines set by their national governments. More 
illustrative however, may be the decision-making structure of the PSC. Made up of national 
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ambassador level representatives, it is often seen by scholars and analysts as the linchpin for 
decisions on CSDP. Quantitative data procured through surveys done show that a strong value is 
placed on the informal meetings and norms that have developed between these representatives. 
In addition, 80% of those asked said that they saw their work with CSDP as helping to form a 
European identity and saw this as a necessary task (Howorth 2012, 445). They also referenced 
the previously mentioned idea of shifting decision-making from a purely rational negotiation to a 
consensus building operation. These three parts of the decision-making process show that a 
strong focus is given to the more informal side of meetings within the European Union, and 
specifically in relation to CSDP. There are other structures and individuals within the CSDP 
structure with influence, such as the EU Military Committee, Civilian Committee, and the High 
Representative; however, these will be brought up in more detail during the analysis and 
implications sections of the paper. 
 
 In regards to the concrete actions taken by NATO in the security arena, the organization 
has a long tradition of providing defense support in Europe, but its move after the Cold War to 
an increased focus on out-of-area operations has led it to operation around the world. Two 
examples used in this analysis will be Operation Ocean Shield– an anti-piracy effort off the Horn 
of Africa, and Operation Joint Endeavor – an officially concluded mission in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. The first operation is an ongoing mission focused on combatting the issue of piracy 
in east Africa and the waters around the area. Because of the strategic importance of the Gulf of 
Aden and this region of the Indian Ocean, the issue is especially prevalent for NATO. The 
current iteration of the operation began in 2009 and NATO forces have worked with other 
organizations and third countries to both directly fight and disrupt pirates, but also to conduct 
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surveillance and train local forces to fight the pirates. This mission illustrates a case in which 
NATO forces work alongside European Union personnel on a common goal but under different 
command structures and with varying methods. The NATO website’s official section on the 
mission highlights improving “regional capacity-building” and dissolving “logistics and support” 
as key methods for achieving mission goals (www.nato.int). The second operation in question is 
one that has officially ended, although some NATO forces remain in the area for support 
purposes. The initial piece of this operation, now known as Joint Endeavor, was the first military 
engagement undertaken by NATO in the post-Cold War era. As the conflict evolved, the 
response and level of engagement in both troop number and strategic importance also grew. 
Although there was the official establishment of a “single, democratic, and multiethnic state” and 
elections were held in 1996, NATO forces remained there until 2004 to supervise the transition 
and prevent further violence (www.nato.int). Despite the official transfer of operational 
responsibility to the European Union, some forces remain to work on internal defense reform, 
fight terrorism, and apprehend war criminals. 
 For the EU, there have been many firsts in the last two decades, but the two missions 
mentioned above will be used to maintain consistency for the analysis to come. Both operations 
represent important actions, and they have helped the Union maintain involvement, at differing 
levels, in global security affairs. Operation Atalanta/NAVFOR is the maritime mission 
conducted off the coast of Somalia and focusing on the piracy highly prevalent in the region. Just 
like with the NATO led mission, Atalanta intends to disrupt pirates directly, but it also 
specifically alludes to the groups as organized crime units and treats this mission as anti-piracy 
but also anti-crime and in this way differs slightly from the stated NATO operation. The CSDP 
website notes two unique goals for Atalanta that set it apart from other similar missions: protect 
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World Food Programme shipments and local fishing operations. The second mission is a follow 
up to NATO’s Joint Endeavor, named Operation Althea. While most of the combat had already 
ceased, the Council approved the mission to take over for previous NATO efforts (Djikstra, 458). 
This deployment is listed as a Police Mission as opposed to a full-scale deployment with the goal 
of supporting a peaceful transition and assisting in the training of national police and defense 
forces. Finally, the ideas of ensuring a “strong commitment to the international community” and 
providing the ability for Bosnia Herzegovina to stay “on track towards EU membership” are the 
most important goals for the mission (www.euforbih.org). 
The next section will address the theoretical framework through which these sources will 
be analyzed, and the reasoning behind the specific theories and ideas chosen for this purpose. By 
bringing together the historical and developmental background with the theory, the initial 
sections of this research intend to create an appropriately strong foundation on which to build the 
analysis that will follow. 
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III. Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this research focuses around two main theory families – 
international relations and integration theories. By using both types, they analysis will be better 
able to address the cases of NATO and CSDP from a structural standpoint as institutions and 
from a decision-making perspective as international actors. The main theories used here will be 
realism, constructivism, historical institutionalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism since each 
provides a varying viewpoint from which to see NATO and CSDP. 
 Realism is an important theory because it has defined much of the strategy used by the 
United States, and therefore NATO since the beginning of the Cold War (and even earlier, 
though the prior periods hold less relevance for this research). It is possible to see that NATO 
was in fact formed, at least in part, because of realist thinking. Given that the alliance came into 
relevance as a major player to balance the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact, it illustrates the 
realist idea of balance of power (Ashley 1981). The power dynamic within NATO also 
represents some key values of realism in that, despite the appearance of an equal influence, the 
United States holds a very strong sway over the actions of the alliance. It is also important to 
note that NATO represents individual states and does not have an independent, overarching 
structure similar to that of the European Union. Realism is also important for the implications of 
this analysis because it will suggest courses of action for U.S. and European policymakers, 
concerning the institutions in which they take part. After all, in realist theory, national interest is 
the primary motivation for state action, and so any choice a state is a part of should serve to 
advance these interests (Wolfowitz 2009, 68).  Realism is this context will help to make some of 
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the main points in the analysis and begin to show that despite the more unified institutions of the 
European Union, the power lies with the individual nations, which leads to the meat of the 
analysis for this research.  
 Constructivism applies more easily to the structure and action of the European Union, 
although certain tenants of the theory can be seen in NATO and U.S. actions as well. While 
much of the realist theory looks to international anarchy and rational independent actors, the 
constructivist tradition uses socially created ideals to interpret important events and actors. 
Within the EU, the focus on informal norms and forming a common identity gives value to the 
ideas of constructivism. (Guzzini 2000) The process of socialization also encourages states to 
look at the international arena through a more constructivist lens, which shows the importance of 
understanding more than simply the rational facts but also the value in social interaction and 
interstate cooperation with higher goals than national interest. Constructivism is valuable for this 
analysis because it creates an alternative to the realist tradition most commonly associated with 
U.S. grand strategy (Wendt). It also provides a stronger reflexive tool with which to assess the 
actions of NATO and CSDP than does other international relations theories. Finally, the utility of 
constructivism for this research arrives in its social element. While the interactions between the 
two institutions has less to do with social construction, the actions they choose to undertake are 
certainly under the influence of various social elements at the national and international level 
(Guzzini 2000). 
 Historical Institutionalism as a theory of integration helps the analysis to look into the 
ways that NATO and CSDP have changed from the end of the Cold War until the present, and 
speaks to the importance of this institutional evolution in the overall international system. It also 
falls in line with this research due to a long-term approach to understanding the actions of 
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national or international actors. As Broschek (2012, 103) puts it, historical institutionalism (HI) 
focuses on “moving pictures” instead of “snapshots” when looking to explain the actions and 
decisions of actors. This indicates a strong impact of timing on decisions, and lends itself to a 
look at the post-Cold War era since both organizations in question here were victims of 
inopportune timing when the wall fell and they had to change their form in order to survive. 
Another important tenant of HI is path dependency. Although this sounds to be a sort of 
determinism, in fact it is simply used to help simplify the analysis of actions throughout long and 
“far-reaching” periods of change (Broschek 2012, 104). This sort of path dependency will be 
relevant in the analysis and implication of this research because it creates theoretical support for 
the influence of single nations on the trajectory of a larger international organization. 
 Lastly, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) plays a large role in understanding why actors 
aggregate and form larger organizations. As an integration theory, it helps us to make sense of 
the formation of the European Union and, through this, gives us insight into the types of 
dynamics present within institutions that have formed through this model. Among most scholars, 
LI is a baseline theory in this field and its popularity relates to the saliency it has with relation to 
the way that the EU developed over the years since the end of World War II. An important part 
to the integration process that LI recognizes is the functional progression of institutions and the 
decision-making processes (Franchino 2012, 325). As a theory, it competes with institutionalism 
on the way that states cooperate within integrated institutions, but it provides valuable insight 
and a strong counterbalance through which to assess the strengths and weaknesses of decision-
making processes. One thing that separates the two integration theories is that LI falls in line 
more with the constructivist theoretical family, as it predicts negotiations ending at a point that 
falls above the lowest common denominator for involved parties (Franchino 2012, 334). This can 
14 
be seen throughout many, but not all, Union decisions on priority issues. A final part of LI is a 
focus on state preference, yet this theory proposes that such preferences are more “issue specific” 
than wholesale viewpoints. 
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IV. Analysis 
 The analysis for this research will be broken down into sections on each of the two 
institutions as well as a section that compares and contrasts NATO and the European Union. This 
structure intends to show that each has individual strengths and weaknesses before bringing the 
analysis together with the head-to-head comparison and analysis. Furthermore, such an analytical 
structure will set the stage for a discussion about the potential implications of the analysis. 
a. NATO Case 
 When thinking about the development of NATO after the end of the Cold War, and the 
impact that the United States might have on the decision-making process, one does not have to 
look far. In this case, it is hardly debatable that the U.S. has a very important role in the 
institutional structure and decision-making (Kempin 2013, 59). It is often said that NATO goes 
as the U.S. goes, and one scholar even went as far as to say that “U.S. global military activities 
will determine the future of NATO,” but perhaps the level of influence is not quite as complete 
as many people think (Gärtner 1998, 4). It is possible that the structure that has developed in 
recent years to create a multilateral atmosphere within NATO. A stronger multilateral institution 
would lead to the idea that U.S. impact is diluted by more interaction with other countries during 
decision-making. However, this analysis will not argue that the U.S. is losing its grip on the 
Atlantic Alliance. Instead it will argue for the opposite – that the changes made to NATO 
structures reflect the national interest of the U.S. even more prominently. For this idea to take 
root, however, it is important to consider the way in which American power is projected abroad. 
While most scholars believe that the international atmosphere has moved away from a unipolar 
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system, it is clear that the United States still pursues a grand strategy of primacy. Through this, it 
hopes to create and foster its influence around the globe. Through both political, military, and 
cultural means, the U.S. strives to maintain the head of the order (Brooks, et al). As such, the 
very structure of NATO as a collective defense organization means that if any nation were to 
leave the potential to defend the rest would diminish. However, it is the United States that holds 
the real lynch-pin to  the Alliance, and were it to only worry about its own security it is likely 
that the others (apart from the major European powers) would struggle to maintain their safety 
should a threat arise. Because of this fact, the U.S. can leverage its necessity into influence 
within the organization. After all, as a major international organization, NATO gives the States a 
secondary channel through which to reach its goals. Some feel that unilateralism on the part of 
the U.S. creates levels of resentment among allies and neutral parties alike. It is clear that, while 
governmental leaders do not always make perfect decisions, politicians are aware of the 
international environment in regards to their public opinion and will act to achieve goals in the 
most efficient way possible. While NATO’s decision-making structure focuses around consensus 
building, it is not a unanimity based process and compromise can be steered to benefit unhappy 
states in other ways. It is also clear that because the U.S. provides a large portion of the funding 
and capabilities, and has been the traditional leader, they hold a stronger influence during 
negotiation sessions than smaller countries. There is even a second option for passing decisions 
if they U.S. cannot initially convince allies to agree. While use of the Military Committee as a 
work around only officially excludes France from the process, it indicates to the other major 
power states that the U.S. is serious about the matter at hand. Such a tool allows the U.S. to put 
pressure on other countries (even if they are not France) through a sort of pseudo-brinkmanship. 
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 However more important the following section on the European Union is the role that 
NATO plays in giving the United States influence on other regional security institutions. 
Because the members of NATO are also members of various other organizations like the OSCE 
or EU, the U.S. could use their position and influence in NATO to gain an advantage in other 
institutions. Another advantage that the U.S. has in creating influence internationally is that all 
new members of the European Union have become participants in NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
and then full members prior to gaining Union membership. Such an interaction allows the U.S. 
and the common structure of NATO to impact rising countries prior to their involvement in the 
European Union (Kempin 2013, 60). It is also important to remember that, even though some 
countries may feel resentful of U.S. out of area actions, the States still has much to offer its allies 
in both economic and military standpoints (Brooks 2012, 11). The military side of things also 
comes into play during NATO missions around the world. Due mainly to the presence of the 
U.S., NATO operates many missions and is often the leader of cooperative operations. As was 
mentioned in the background, the end of NATO’s mission in Bosnia Herzegovina occurred in 
2004 yet there are still officials present helping the European Union to oversee its own operation 
(www.nato.int). This shows that other groups rely on the well-established and well-funded 
infrastructure of NATO command to coordinate and run their supposedly ‘independent’ 
missions. Part of this mission overlap stems from the membership overlap that exists between the 
two nations, but much of it comes from the simple fact that NATO has a more experienced and 
established institutional structure for handling such missions. The coordination between NATO 
and other institutions reinforces its importance and gives it a valuable bargaining position that 
can give strong states in NATO (in this case the U.S.) not just a unilateral upper hand but also an 
institutional advantage in negotiations or requests for assistance. It is for these reasons that the 
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research believes that despite a move towards a multilateral structure, NATO still bends to the 
will of the U.S. when it is required to do so. In addition, the Atlantic Alliance actually adds the 
ability of the States to influence the decisions of others because it adds to the strategically 
important resources to which the U.S. has access. This relative doubling of American influence 
means that the States go into talks with a stronger position and a greater reputation behind them. 
b. CSDP Case 
The case of NATO and a look at why the U.S. has a strong overall impact institution is 
not that hard to make, but the following section will test the analysis in a different way, because 
the linkages are not always as clear between the United States and the European Union as an 
institution. This section of the analysis will look to develop points at which the decision making 
structure is open to external influence and then move on to analyze the way that the EU 
operations reflect either the potential for U.S. involvement or actual influence of the United 
States. 
Institutionally, the overlap in membership and security interests led to the development of 
a security infrastructure in CSDP that reflects that of NATO. However, what make the European 
Union structurally unique is that it has both intergovernmental procedures and supranational 
processes. This dichotomy has been pushed together within the EU and this creates an 
unavoidable two level game for politicians and national representatives (Callanan 2011, 17). 
Because of such a situation, the institutions can be accessed from either the institutional level or 
the national level, which gives third parties (such as other states, interest groups, or other 
international organizations) multiple “access points to influence the content of EU legislation” 
(Callanan 2011, 27). Originally, the idea behind CSDP was to give the Union more autonomy 
from NATO on security matters. Despite this intention, an independent development was flawed 
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due to a lack in other comparable models on which to draw lessons. It seemed only logical to 
look to the structure, culture, and strategic goals of NATO as a starting point. One individual had 
as much influence on the development of current CSDP as any other actor, and he is Javier 
Solana. Prior to being appointed as the first High Representative in the European Union, he was 
the Secretary General of NATO and therefore had firsthand experience with the way that the 
Alliance was structured and run. It is unlikely that in the few months between appointments he 
left the U.S. strategic culture he was a part of in NATO and moved to a solely European identity. 
Because of this, he led the development of CSDP in the image of the Atlantic Alliance. He has 
even stated “a new transatlantic bargain is in the making” as a result of “new realities of a new 
century” (Gärtner 1998, 5). This appears indicative of a shift from independence to dependence 
between CSDP and NATO, and shows that now more than ever the European Union relies on the 
U.S. for support in its security infrastructure. 
Strategically, CSDP does not yet have a full set of coordination capabilities and must 
look to the NATO/U.S. command structure for military technology and doctrines. In a similar 
way, U.S. security interests (as presented through NATO) are often accepted as generalizable 
interests for all members of NATO and the European Union. This indicates a sort of cultural 
hegemony, led by the United States, which ties these two major security organizations to one 
another (Kempin 2013, 68). While opponents of realism will argue that, a true military 
hegemony no longer exists in the world, this sort of hegemony reflects a global order in which 
ideas and cultures permeate downward. In this way, such an idea represents a hegemony in the 
way that a constructivist might imagine it to exist. Even though it is still based on military 
prowess, it is not necessarily about true power level but instead a perceived power – a hegemony 
of reputation in which those below do not necessarily fear but strive to emulate those above 
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them. The European Commission has even fed into such a hegemony by suggesting to its 
members “that spending on the security and defence industry should emulate the U.S.” (Kempin 
2013, 62). Another important factor that has led the Union to be open to U.S. influence and 
NATO assistance is that they are doing exactly what the Commission suggested and are striving 
to be a major player in the security arena despite working with a severely limited defense budget. 
They cannot have both an impressive defense institution and one that is cheap as well. Therefore, 
they have chosen the expensive American model, and then rely on NATO to supplant the 
capabilities they cannot afford on their own. Such a situation looks like clear evidence to the 
influence that the U.S. has over CSDP. If this influence did not exist, the European Union would 
choose a reduced security dimension that allows them to avoid competition with NATO at all. 
Anderson and Seitz (2006, 31) identify another point that can help to illustrate the struggles that 
CSDP has had in creating a truly autonomous security institution. They talk about how the Union 
is currently focusing more effort on the process of nation building, but has not yet reached the 
stage of state building. This is relevant because while the EU is trying to create a single identity, 
it cannot yet effectively create the functions that will make it resemble a single state. CSDP is 
often tagged as an effort to rally support for the European identity, but such a campaign seems 
likely to be unsuccessful since most individual states have drawn back their own militaries. 
 In relation to military, civilian, or police actions carried out by CSDP, there are a few 
examples that illustrate just how reliant on NATO and the U.S. the European Union operations 
are. The first instance came at the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia. At the time, Union supporters 
hailed this as the opportunity for the Union to prove it was capable of being a global security 
actor. The U.S. allowed them the first chance to solve the crisis, but NATO ended up taking the 
lead in the Yugoslav engagement after the EU could not muster the force needed. Operation 
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Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina also illustrates the need for NATO (or U.S.) involvement. The 
2004 mission actually increased burden sharing between the two actors and decrease the 
autonomy of European Union actions. It took advantage of the Berlin Plus agreement on 
capability sharing and used much of the preexisting command structure NATO left behind when 
the majority of its forces were withdrawn. Many have claimed that “Europeans are not loathe to 
use force,” but they must recognize that until such a time as the Union can convince its members 
to pay more into CSDP, NATO will continue to be a necessary part of any European led 
expeditionary mission. Overall, since the end of the Cold War the influence of the U.S. has 
fluctuated but has remained in existence. In the early 1990s the U.S. were seen as overbearing, 
and so they evolved the relationship with Europe into one with more nuance in which the 
influence is still there but the impact is lighter.  
c. Differences and Similarities 
 So what is different between how the U.S. can influence NATO and CSDP? This 
question is straightforward, and the analysis thus far has hoped to show that there are many ways 
that the U.S. has an easier time shaping decision making in NATO. As a founding member with 
a tradition of leadership, the States leads NATO’s negotiation process. Throughout the analysis 
up to this point, evidence has been provided to support this role as a senior member and leader 
within the Alliance. Without the U.S., the NATO would likely not have survived the post-Cold 
War transition. Much of the Atlantic Alliance’s capability relies on the funding, technology, and 
troops of the United States. These can be seen as the main factors that grant the U.S. its strong 
influence on the decision-making process of NATO. On the other hand, determining American 
influence in CSDP has been a more a complicated case. The structure, procedures, and 
membership all prove to be obstacles that the U.S. must overcome in any attempt to create and 
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foster its national interest within the European Union. Because the U.S. has no direct method to 
affect the decision-making process, it has to take other avenues to have its voice heard and 
respected in regards to important issues or missions. It has used globalization to spread both its 
popular culture and strategic culture to its allies around the world, and through this, it has 
become the model after which to build a security regime. This illustrates that the influence 
exercised in CSDP requires more effort but does not seem to have any less value vis-à-vis its 
effectiveness. These are the key ways in which the two institutions requires different strategies 
and levels of effort to be affected.  
 However, the similarities between the two organizations might be just as telling in the 
context of this analysis. Because CSDP was modelled in part after NATO, it shares many 
common structures and processes. Both prefer consensus, and although the European Union 
pushes for unanimity, the fact that formal voting is avoidable in each setting shows that 
American experience in NATO negotiations benefit should they attempt to involve themselves in 
CSDP matters. The two organizations have moved toward a focus on crisis management as the 
new idea of what the regional security institution should do. Clearly, NATO’s capabilities allow 
it to participate in more heavy military operations, but the common shift to management over 
intervention shows a sharing of strategic culture and an exchanging of ideas. Such interactions 
create another avenue for American influence, and in fact represent the presence of U.S. ideals in 
CSDP, since much of the European Union’s military doctrine and strategy has migrated from 
NATO. Despite the supranational character of some aspects of the EU, both organizations 
ultimately answer to their members in regards to security actions. This intergovernmentalism 
shows that even with the Union’s higher aspirations, individual states still value their sovereignty 
on security issues. This is important for the U.S. because it shows that realism still permeates all 
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states and such common ground can be used to influence CSDP via individual members. The two 
groups have also conducted missions in many of the same locations, and during these missions 
have shared command infrastructure and local facilities. This proximity might make access to an 
integral part of the decision process, commanders on the ground, easier and a connection made in 
the field might be more valuable than one made in Brussels. This brings up another similarity – 
they both operate from a headquarters in Belgian capital. Just like shared field command 
structures, this allows for intermingling of personnel and the creation of a single shared culture, 
potentially shaped by American popular and strategic culture. 
 Such similarities and differences show that while the two institutions are unique 
organizations, their commonalities are important for creating access points for U.S. influence in 
either organization. Having so much in common also illustrates just how much CSDP relies on 
the capabilities of NATO to carry out its actions. In fact, only monitoring missions or rescue 
operations have been carried out by the EU in a manner that was entirely independent of NATO 
structures or capabilities (Gärtner 1998, 12). Perhaps the most important commonality is that 
despite the varying configuration of states, the European Union contains U.S. allies and as such, 
anything that affects Europe will have some repercussions for the government in the United 
States. This idea leads perfectly from the analysis into the implications of the research for policy 
and practice in the U.S. or Europe. 
d. Conclusions 
 The analysis above has brought out a few key points that can help to illustrate the 
connection between the United States, the European Union, and the regional security 
organizations they occupy. Firstly, by showing the predominance of the U.S. in NATO, the 
analysis provides an example of how one country can lead an alliance of strong states and have 
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strong influence throughout. This is relevant to the goal of the paper because it gives credence to 
the argument that the States could have an impact on the way that European security is handled 
at an intergovernmental level. By looking into the impact of the U.S. on NATO, the analysis also 
led into a better understanding of how the U.S. might be able to exercise it power within the 
European Union, an institution of which it is not a part. Through unilateral negotiations, 
individual influence, structural model imitation, and other such channels the U.S. has had a large 
role in the way that CSDP developed and continues to operate. In regards to current operations, 
the burden sharing that occurs between NATO and CSDP provides another manner in which an 
advantage can be exercised by U.S. leaders over the missions and actions the European Union 
takes. While they certainly are not likely to make constant use of such a tactic, the possibility 
exists that withholding NATO capabilities might affect the decision-making process within 
CSDP. The analysis has also been shaped to show that while CSDP is unique in many ways, its 
structure, mission, and very existence has been the product of the influence of NATO and the 
U.S. Whether such influence was direct or indirect, intended or accidental, it is hard to ignore 
that the CSDP has come to resemble the model first used by NATO under the supervision of the 
United States. The fact that they share the same city for their base of operations, and share many 
of the same members shows that ideas and thoughts flow between the two. While CSDP was 
created to separate Europe from the will of the United States, this has not occurred in the way 
that was originally desired and it may have tied the two even closer together.  
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V. Implications and Further Research 
So why are such conclusions about the interconnectivity of these two organizations, of the U.S. 
and Europe, important for practical people in government or academia? It is in part because the 
connection flies in the face of the recently anointed “pacific pivot” as created by scholarly and 
popular publications alike (Beitelman 2012, 1086). By concluding that the opportunity for 
influence is still alive, the analysis gives politicians in the United States reasons to maintain the 
connection it already has and not risk losing its valuable influence. It also opens the door for U.S. 
policymakers to continue the grand strategy of primacy it has used instead of opting to look 
within the United States and retreat from the longstanding international commitments it has 
developed. Clearly, this analysis does not address the likelihood of any of the possible outcomes, 
or look in depth at the mood of any particular governing body. However, it does paint a more 
general picture of the importance of the connection for the United States and also for the 
European Union and its members. With this in mind, there are also implications of this analysis 
that are important for the Union, depending on the path it wishes to take in the future. Should the 
EU desire to continue its operations with the support of NATO resources, it need only maintain 
the ties described and analyzed here. On the other hand, if there is some level of hesitancy about 
the depth of such an influence by a single actor, no matter their intentions, then this analysis 
could provide European decision makers with a means of understanding how their processes are 
susceptible to outside influence. This could in turn lead to a renewed push for military 
independence from NATO, as was the original intention of the CSDP project. Overall, the 
analysis and its conclusions can be seen as a good starting point for a lengthier discussion on the 
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actual impact of the United States on European regional security. Such research could look more 
deeply into the political climate of the two institutions (through primary sources), the major 
actors in each (more such interviews), and the more technical specifics of each body’s decision-
making structure. 
  
27 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Regional security organizations play an important role in the way that states interact and 
that decisions are made. The current distribution demands a focus on the two main European 
organizations of this nature, NATO and CSDP. While the Atlantic Alliance has existed for a 
much longer period, their contemporary forms developed during the same moment. The end of 
the Cold War was a catalyst for change around the world, and the impact that it had on global 
politics created the power dynamic that exists between the two institutions. By virtue of direct 
U.S. involvement in NATO, there is a stronger case for American interests leading this group. 
However, this thesis has sought to show that despite the initial aims of the Common Security and 
Defense Policy, the United States can also play an influential role in the development of EU 
security policy and implementation. From unilateral agreements to burden sharing, the U.S. 
government has many avenues to engage in European security. Given the current international 
climate, this integration into the continent benefits both the States and the Union, and can help to 
increase the strength of connections between the countries and the overarching security 
organizations. This analysis cannot say whether the governments believe in their own rhetoric 
about the shift to a larger focus on the pacific, but it does indicate that Europe is still of vital 
importance to the United States, and it has hoped to make the network of influence connecting 
the two clearer.  
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